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Abstract
Intuitively, confession is a strong piece of evidence, because
it appears unlikely that a suspect would confess to a crime
he did not commit, thereby acting against his own best
interest. Surprisingly, experimental studies show that inno-
cent and well-educated individuals do tend to confess false-
ly when questioned about something they did not in fact
do. In this contribution, an overview is presented of the
experimental research on confession evidence. Limitations
and implications of the scientific insights are discussed.
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1 Introduction
A confession is a very strong piece of evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings, if not, in the words of Kassin, ‘the
prosecutor’s most potent weapon’.1 This is arguably so,
because if the suspect himself confesses, it is intuitively
likely that he is indeed guilty. Note that the suspect has
good reason not to confess. The positive appreciation of
confession evidence implies that false confessions are
scarce or even non-existent. In the words of Inbau et al.:
‘It is our contention, however, that an innocent suspect
operating within normal limits of competency would not
accept physical responsibility for an act he knows he did
not commit.’2
Notwithstanding this common sense notion, from time
to time, false confessions do occur and contribute to
major miscarriages of justice.3 Infamous examples are
the Birmingham six, the Guilford four, and in the
United States, Henry Lee Lucas.4 The question then is
whether these false confessions can be discarded as
incidents. Experimental research suggests that they can-
not. The aim of the present contribution is to present an
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overview of the experimental research on confession evi-
dence. Limitations and implications of this body of
research will be tapped.
2 Experimental Paradigm for
False Confessions
The effect of others on individuals’ behaviour has been
well-documented for several decades. For example,
people have been found to have a strong tendency to
conform to group norms, even at the cost of setting
aside personal convictions.5 People also seem to be high-
ly sensitive to authority. In his seminal study, Milgram
found that the majority of participants were willing to
apply dangerous electrical shocks to fellow participants,
if instructed to do so by the experiment leader.6 Our
recollection can also be influenced by social interaction.
For example, participants remembered a videotaped car
crash to be more severe if the question contained the
word ‘smash’, compared to the employment of words
like ‘contact’ and ‘hit’.7 Leading questions can also make
us believe that we saw videos which we did in fact not
see.8
The examples of the effect of social influences of indi-
vidual behaviour discussed above are remote from false
confessions in that they do not imply that the individual
acts against his own best interest, while that is a crucial
feature of a false confession. Notably, contemporary leg-
islation and ethical guidelines make it difficult to make
participants in scientific research (temporarily) act
against their best interest. For example, it is ethically
impossible to falsely accuse a participant of having com-
mitted murder and to incarcerate him for multiple days.
To gain some insight into the extent to which people are
susceptible to falsely confessing, Gudjonsson et al. asked
24,627 young adults whether they had ever been
questioned by the police: 2,726 of them answered this
5. S.E. Asch, ‘Opinions and Social Pressure’, 193 Scientific American 31
(1955).
6. S. Milgram, ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’, 67 Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology 371 (1963). J.M. Burger, ‘Replicating Milgram:
Would People Still Obey Today?’, 64 American Psychologist 1 (2009).
7. E.F. Loftus and J.C. Palmer, ‘Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction:
An Example of the Interaction between Language and Memory’, 13
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 585 (1974).
8. H.F.M. Crombag, W.A. Wagenaar & P.J. van Koppen, ‘Crashing Mem-
ories and the Problem of ‘source Monitoring’, 10 Applied Cognitive
Psychology 95 (1996). M. Jelicic, T. Smeets, M.J.V. Peters, I. Candel,
R. Horselenberg & H. Merckelbach, ‘Assassination of a Controversial
Politician: Remembering Details from Another Non-existent Film’, 20
Applied Cognitive Psychology 591 (2006).
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question affirmatively and 375 reported having given a
false confession (i.e. 13.8%).9 These findings are
impressive in various ways, for example in that they
pertain to real-life interrogations, and the number of
respondents (recruited across Europe) is considerable.
However, the findings are also limited, for example in
that they are silent about the number of true confes-
sions, and in scientific terms, it must be admitted that
they are not the fruit of experimental research.
In the past twenty years, researchers have succeeded in
developing experimental paradigms that yield findings
that try to model the effects of real interrogations.
First, Kassin and Kiechel invited seventy-nine
undergraduates to participate in a reaction time comput-
er task.10 Participants were explicitly prohibited to press
the alt-key, because that would cause the computer to
crash and all data to be lost. A few minutes after the
experiment had commenced, the computer screen
turned blank, and the experiment leader entered the
room accusing the participant of having pressed the alt-
key. In fact, alt-key presses were registered, and none of
the participants had actually pressed it. The question
was how many participants were willing to sign a writ-
ten confession of having pressed the alt-key. Before
looking at the results, it is important to acknowledge
two crucial variables. First, some participants had
worked under low time pressure (i.e. 43 stimuli per
minute), whereas others had worked under high pres-
sure (i.e. 67 stimuli). Second, in some cases, a fellow-
participant testified that (s)he had witnessed that the
participant had pressed the alt-key. Again, this fellow-
participant was in fact a co-worker of the experiment
leader. Hence in these cases, there was false incriminat-
ing evidence. The percentage of participants signing the
confession as a function of time pressure and additional
incriminating witness evidence is displayed in Table 1.
As can be seen in the first row (compliance) an astonish-
ing high percentage of participants did sign the confes-
sion. Further, time pressure and false witness testimony
increased confession rates.
Kassin and Kiechel also tried to explore what reasons
participants had to sign the confession. To gain some
insight therein, a second confederate who supposedly
was waiting for his turn to participate outside of the lab-
oratory asked the participant what had happened during
the experiment. Based on this conversation, it could be
assessed whether the participant had confessed against
better judgment (i.e. compliance; e.g. ‘they accused me
of pressing the alt-key, but I didn’t, I confessed any-
way’), or whether (s)he had actually started to believe in
his guilt (i.e. internalisation; e.g. ‘I must have pressed
the alt-key’), or even confabulated details explaining
9. G.H. Gudjonsson, J.F. Sigurdsson & I.D. Sigfusdottir, ‘Interrogation and
False Confessions among Adolescents in Seven European Countries:
What Background and Psychological Variables Best Discriminate
between False Confessors and Non-false Confessors?’, 15 Psychology,
Crime & Law 711 (2009).
10. S.M. Kassin and K.L Kiechel, ‘The Social Psychology of False Confes-
sions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation’, 7 Psychological
Science 125 (1996).
why (s)he pressed the alt-key (i.e. confabulation; e.g. ‘I
went out late yesterday, and that is why my head was
not very clear, and I hit the alt-key’). As can be seen, a
substantial proportion of the confessing participants
indeed believed that they were guilty.
This final part of the study taps on an important
theoretical aspect of false confession. That is, apart from
voluntary, non-coerced false confessions (e.g. to become
[in]famous, or to protect the actual perpetrator),
two types of coerced false confessions are generally
distinguished. First, in case of a coerced compliant con-
fession, the suspect confesses, while knowing that the
confession is false. A reason to do so may be the belief
that confessing will stop the interrogation and/or will
lead to reduction of penalty. Second, in case of a coerced
internalised confession, the suspect is brought to believe
that he actually did commit the pertinent crime. Differ-
ent psychological processes are thought to underlie
these two types of confessions. A coerced compliant
confession is based on the tendency to comply, to avoid
conflict, and to please one’s conversational partner. By
contrast, a coerced internalised confession occurs if the
suspect suffers from inferior memory and/or increased
suggestibility.11
Approximately ten years after the study by Kassin and
Kiechel, Russano et al. developed a new paradigm to
study false confessions.12 In this case, undergraduates
(N = 196) completed several pen and paper tasks in
duos (one actual participant and the other member of
the pair was a confederate). For some tasks, it was
explicitly forbidden to work together. In the ‘guilty’
condition, the confederate asked the participant for help
on one of the assignments that were to be completed
individually. Most of the participants acted friendly,
helped the confederate, but thereby broke the rules. In
the 'innocent' condition, all individual tasks were indeed
completed individually. At the end of the test, the
experiment leader informed the duo that he had noticed
something strange: in one of the individual tasks, both
members of the pair had given the same wrong answer.
Hence, the suspicion of cheating arose. Participants
were taken apart and questioned about this. With this
design, participants in the guilty condition may confess
truly (note that true confessions did not occur in the
study by Kassin & Kiechel), and those in the innocent
condition may confess falsely.
Russano et al. tested four interrogation protocols: (i) a
protocol in which the participant was merely accused of
having worked together, without further tactics, (ii) a
protocol in which a deal was offered to the participant
('things could probably be settled quickly if you sign the
confession'), (iii) one in which crime severity was mini-
mised ('I am sure you just wanted to help, and didn’t
realise what a big deal it was'), and (iv) one in which the
deal and minimisation were combined.
11. Gudjonsson et al. (2009), above n. 9.
12. M.B. Russano, C.A. Meissner, F.M. Narchet & S.M. Kassin, ‘Investigat-
ing True and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm’,
16 Psychological Science 481 (2005).
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Table 2 presents the percentages of confessing
participants (true and false) as a function of interroga-
tion protocol. As can be seen, the number of true con-
fessions increases with the employment of subtle tactics,
but so (and even more so) does the number of false con-
fessions. Consequently, the diagnostic value, which is
simply the percentage of true confessions divided by the
percentage of false ones, decreases. Note that if the
diagnostic value reaches one, a confession no longer dis-
criminates between guilty and innocent suspects. Ideal-
ly, the diagnostic value of the evidence as a whole has
been argued to be at least 24.13 Hence, the data neatly
illustrate that a confession does not suffice to conclude
that the suspect is guilty.
3 Summary of Experiments on
False Confessions
Since the introduction of the two paradigms described
in the previous paragraph, the original studies by Kassin
and Kiechel in 1996 and Russano et al. in 2005 have
been replicated several times. To gain overview of this
literature, search engine Scopus was consulted in
March-April 2013 following two strategies. First, the
term ‘false confession’ was entered, resulting in 225 hits.
Second, 123 articles citing the original Kassin and
Kiechel study were searched. Title and abstract of all
publications were scanned to determine whether the
article described an experiment on false confessions.
The result of this literature search is presented in Table
3. Sixteen articles were obtained, describing twenty-one
experiments. The mean weighted false confession rate
was 45% (range: 4% to 100%).
True confession rates and the diagnostic value of con-
fessions can only be calculated from studies employing
the Russano et al. paradigm, because those experiments
include false and true confessions. Based on those stud-
ies, the mean true confession rate turned out to be 74%.
The diagnostic value of a confession is (74% divided by
24% [331 innocent participants of whom 78 confessed])
3.1. The literature sheds some preliminary light on the
causes of false confessions. Or given the large percent-
age of false confessions, it may be better to simply take
human susceptibility to social context as the primary
cause of false confession and to merely search for factors
that aggravate or limit the tendency to falsely confess.
First, as borne out by the data of Kassin and Kiechel
several situational factors are relevant. Both cognitive
load (i.e. time pressure) and false incriminating witness
statements increased false confession rate. As known
from the study by Russano et al., minimising crime
severity and offering lenience also promote the occur-
rence of false confessions. Plausibility of the accusation
13. W.A. Wagenaar, P.J. van Koppen & H.F.M. Crombag, Anchored narra-
tives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence (1993).
may also influence the likelihood of admission.14 Final-
ly, the interrogator’s eagerness to elicit a confession may
also increase the likelihood of a false confession.15
Second, in theory, several personality characteristics can
be expected to promote the tendency to falsely confess.
Compliance should be associated with confessing in an
experimental set-up. However, the findings are not
encouraging, or mixed to say the least.16 Similar ambi-
guity can be seen when exploring the relation between
suggestibility and false confessions: in some studies such
a relation is observed,17 in others it is not.18 By and
large, evidence for a relation between theoretically
meaningful personality characteristics and false confes-
sions is meagre.
4 Discussion
The data summarised in Table 3 suggest that normal
individuals (i.e. non-clinical and non-selected partici-
pants) are quite susceptible to falsely confess when
questioned about a crime. Evidently, there are some
limitations to the scientific data. First, the consequences
of a false confession in the experiments discussed are
substantially inferior to those in real police
investigations. Researchers have employed small finan-
cial punishments, working as a lab-assistant, and threats
of disciplinary measures as negative consequences. Such
consequences are not comparable to long prison senten-
ces. However, the social pressure to which students are
exposed in the experiments is analogously inferior to
that to which suspects in police interrogations are
subjected. In fact, it can well be argued that the pres-
sure-consequences ratio of real police interrogations and
scientific experiments are comparable, after all.
Nonetheless, the extrapolation from laboratory studies
as described in the present contribution to real-life sit-
uations remains problematic.
Second, it must be stressed that the scientific data do
not imply that 45% of all confessions are false. This is
so, because the base rate of innocent suspects in police
investigations is unknown. To illustrate, researcher
14. J.R. Klaver, Z. Lee & V.G. Rose, ‘Effects of Personality, Interrogation
Techniques and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession Para-
digm’, 13 Legal and Criminological Psychology 71 (2008).
15. F.M. Narchet, C.A. Meissner & M.B. Russano, ‘Modeling the Influence
of Investigator Bias on the Elicitation of True and False Confessions’, 35
Law and Human Behavior 452 (2011).
16. J.P. Blair, ‘The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differ-
ences in Producing Compliant False Confessions’, 13 Psychology, Crime
& Law 173 (2007). R. Horselenberg, H. Merckelbach & S. Josephs,
‘Individual Differences and False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication
of Kassin and Kiechel (1996)’, 9 Psychology, Crime and Law 1 (2003).
17. Klaver et al. (2008), above n. 14. A.D. Redlich and G.S. Goodman,
‘Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age
and Suggestibility’, 27 Law and Human Behavior 141 (2003).
18. I. Candel, H. Merckelbach, S. Loyen & H. Reyskens, ‘“I Hit the Shift-key
and Then the Computer crashed”: Children and False Admissions’, 38
Personality and Individual Differences 1381 (2005). Horselenberg et al.
(2003), above n. 16. K.D. Forrest, T.A., Wadkins & R.L. Miller, ‘The
Role of Preexisting Stress on False Confessions: An Empirical Study’, 3
Journal of Credibility Assessment and Witness Psychology 23 (2002).
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Kassin once asked a police interrogator whether he
feared the occurrence of false confessions. The officer
replied: ‘No, because I do not interrogate innocent
people.’19 If this were so, the scientific data on false
confessions would not be alarming: 45% of zero inno-
cent suspects is still zero. Imagine that only 10% of all
interrogated suspects were innocent and 90% were guil-
ty. According to data in Table 3, 45% of the innocents
confess and 74% of the guilty ones do. Thus, if 100 sus-
pects (of which 10 are innocent) are interrogated, this
will yield 71 confessions (of which 67 true and 4 false).
Hence, given a 90-10 base rate of guilty and innocent
suspects, 5.6% of the obtained confessions will be false.
The assumption that the base rate of innocent suspects
is less than 50% may make the current findings corre-
spond with some figures on miscarriages of justice,
which are about 2%.20
Finally, it is important to realise that suspects are incar-
cerated and are thus isolated from the outside world.
This may lead them to not perceive confessing during
an interrogation as acting against their own best interest.
Confession may well be considered the only fast and
easy way out of the unpleasant situation in which the
suspect finds himself. Recently, police in various
Western countries have started to videotape interroga-
tions and/or to allow counsellors to be present. These
measures are meant to reduce police misconduct, to
increase transparency (including the possibility to evalu-
ate the interrogation in hindsight), and to decrease the
risk of false confessions. However, the interventions
may not always reach their goal. For example, Kassin
alerted his audience to the possibility of framing bias
(i.e. using ambiguous fragments of a videotaped inter-
rogation in a way that suits the prosecutor or the
defence) and point-of-view-bias (i.e. videotaping the
interrogation from an angle that makes it impossible to
see the interrogators).21 Notwithstanding, Kassin et al.
recently found that the announced videotaping of inter-
rogation, indeed, has beneficial effects such as a decrease
19. S.M. Kassin, ‘On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?’, 60 American Psychologist 215 (2005).
20. S.R. Gross and B. O’Brien, ‘Frequency and Predictors of False Convic-
tions: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases’, 5
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 927 (2005).
21. Kassin (2007).
in the tendency to employ trickery.22 As to the presence
of a counsellor, it must be acknowledged that this is in
some cases indeed nothing more than being present.
One of us recently saw an interrogation in which a law-
yer was present. The interrogators gave the lawyer the
following instruction: 'You shall not interfere with the
interrogation; do not answer any questions posed to the
suspect; do not comment on any questions; you shall not
be in contact with the suspect during the interrogation;
it is prohibited to tape the interrogation; if you do not
comply with these rules, we will stop the interrogation
and order you to leave.' Such an instruction reduces the
lawyer to a silent observer, not unlike a memory-less
video-recorder. Although knowing that a lawyer is pres-
ent may positively affect the suspect and the interroga-
tors, it remains to be seen whether the presence of a
lawyer indeed protects the suspect from giving a false
confession.23
In conclusion, although false confessions are counter-
intuitive because of their self-inflicting nature, the
experimental research suggests that innocent individuals
are surprisingly easily seduced to falsely confess a crime.
And these scientific data do construe a warning that
confession evidence may not be as strong as our
intuition dictates.
22. S.M. Kassin, J. Kukucka, V.Z. Lawson & J. DeCarlo, ‘Does Video
Recording alter the Behavior of Police during Interrogation? A Mock
Crime-and-Investigation Study’, 38 Law and Human Behavior 73 (in
press).
23. W.J. Verhoeven and L. Stevens, ‘The Lawyer in the Dutch Interrogation
Room: Influence on Police and Suspect’, 9 Journal of Investigative Psy-
chology and Offender Profiling 69 (2012).
Table 1 Percentages of falsely confessing participants as a function of time pressure (pace) and false evidence (presence of
witness).
No witness Witness
Low pace (43) High pace (67) Low pace High pace
Compliance 35 65 89 100
Internalisation 0 12 44 65
Confabulation 0 0 6 35
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Table 2 Percentages of confessing participants as a function of interrogation tactic.
True confession False confession Diagnostic value
No tactic 46 6 7.7
Deal 72 14 5.1
Minimisation 81 18 4.5
Deal + minimisation 87 43 2.0
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Table 3 Main results of the experiments (in chronological order) on false confessions.









Kassin & Kiechel (1996) Computer crash Students - - 75 52 (69%)
Forrest et al. (2002) Computer crash students - - 56 34 (61%)
Horselenberg et al. (2003) Computer crash Students - - 34 27 (82%)
Redlich & Goodman (2003) Computer crash 12-26 year olds - - 96 67 (70%)
Candel et al. (2005) Computer crash 6-9 year olds - - 50 18 (36%)
Russano et al. (2005) Cheating/fraud Students 148 107 (72%) 148 30 (20%)
Horselenberg et al. (2006) Computer crash Students - - 56 38 (68%)
Computer crash Students - - 9 1 (11%)
Cheating/fraud Students - - 12 1 (8%)
Forrest et al. (2006) Computer crash Students - - 98 80 (82%)
Billings et al. (2007) Mock crime 5-9 year olds - - 99 12 (12%)
Blair (2007) Computer crash Students - - 196 54 (28%)
Klaver et al. (2008) Computer crash Students - - 219 88 (40%)
Nash & Wade (2009) Virtual theft Students - - 30 30 (100%)
Virtual theft Students - - 30 28 (93%)
Perillo & Kassin (2011) Computer crash Students - - 71 43 (61%)
Computer crash Students - - 38 22 (60%)
Computer crash Students - - 59 34 (58%)
Narchet et al. (2011) Cheating/fraud Students 90 80 (89%) 90 26 (29%)
Horgan et al. (2012) Cheating/fraud Students 66 59 (89%) 66 21 (32%)
Jordan et al. (2012) Mock crime Students 36 6 (17%) 27 1 (4%)
Total 340 252 (74%) 1559 707 (45%)
Note. Not all authors mention absolute numbers of participant in the respective conditions; in those instances, a 50-50 base rate is assumed.
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